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TAX COMMENT
any portion of such dividend income similarly treats the income as
dividends and becomes entitled to the credit against net income
allowed an individual in determining the amount to be subject to
normal tax rates. Similarly exempt interest income received by the
trust would also be exempt when distributed to a beneficiary. 31
In this brief survey of the law with respect to the taxation of
estates and trusts under the Revenue Act of 1928, no attempt has
been made to go into the finer points that arise in connection with
each individual estate. The general principles of the law as applicable to all estates and trusts have been indicated. Numerous provisions in the law attempt to safeguard the payment of taxes and the
responsibility for3 2such payment is fixed both upon the fiduciary and
the beneficiaries.
BENJAMIN HARROW.

EXCISE TAX-IMMUNITY OF

GOVERNMENTAL

INSTRUMENTAL!-

TIES.-Plaintiff, a business corporation organized under the laws of
Massachusetts, owned a large number of United States Liberty Bonds
and Federal Farm Loan Bonds together with bonds of Massachusetts
counties and municipalities. The Commonwealth, in determining
plaintiff's excise tax for the year 1926, included as a measure of
determination, the interest earned from the federal, county and
municipal bonds. After making payment of the tax under protest,
plaintiff sought an abatement which was denied. Subsequently the
constitutionality of the statute was upheld by the Supreme Judicial
Court. On appeal, held, that the statute is unconstitutional in that
the tax on the federal bonds is in derogation of the constitutional
power of Congress to borrow money on the credit of the United
States, as well as in violation of the Acts of Congress declaring such
bonds and securities to be non-taxable and, as to the county and
municipal bonds, it impairs the obligation of the statutory contract
of the state by which such bonds were made exempt from state taxation. Macallen v. Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep.
432 (1929).
Of particular importance is this decision, not alone because of its
tremendous effect in many jurisdictions, but also because of the trend
of decisions prior to it. No one denies the validity of the statement
that the Federal Government may not tax the income arising from
the obligations of a state or any of its governmental subdivisions,' or
that the states are without right to tax the instrumentalities of the
Rev. Act of 1928, Sec. 163 (a), (b) ; Reg. 74, Art. 821.
'2Ibid. Sec. 161 (b), 311, 312 (a), (b); Reg. 74, Art. 862; U. S. C A.
31, Secs. 191. 192.
1 Collector v. Day. 78 U. S. 113, 124-5 (1870) ; Pollock v. Farmers Loan
and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 583, 588, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 673 (1895).
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Federal Government. 2 It would seem to follow, logically, that any
attempt to tax the exempt instrumentality whether it be by adirect
tax such as one levied directly on property or an indirect tax such
as an excise or privilege tax, should be condemned at its inception.
Indeed the decision in the instant case is an illustration of just such
a situation.
But in this connection it appears that the court had previously
countenanced such action, for, while it had zealously upheld the
immunity of federal and state instrumentalities from taxation, where
a direct tax was concerned, 3 it nevertheless permitted income and
interest from the same instrumentalities to be employed as a measure
in determining excise and franchise taxes.4 What may have been
the ultimate effect of such continued sanction, had it been permitted
to continue, we need not now attempt to predict. Some twenty years
after the decision in Home Insurance Co. v. New York,5 in which
property not subject to a direct tax, was nevertheless included as a
measure in determining a franchise tax, the pendulum began to swing
in the opposite direction. 6 Its movement was retarded by the
decision in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., where a federal excise on doing
business in corporate form measured by all income, including that
received from state and municipal bonds was upheld.7 The instant
'McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819); Osborn v. Bank of
the United States, 9 Wheat. 734 (U. S. 1824); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S.
51, 53, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 16, 17 (1920).
'Sdpra Notes 1 and 2.
"Societe for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594 (U. S. 1867) (a franchise tax
assessed on the total deposits of savings banks was declared constitutional even
though the deposits were invested in federal instrumentalities); Provident Institution for Savings v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611 (U. S. 1867); Home
Insurance Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 593 (1890);
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 343 (1911).
'Supra Note 4 at 601, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 595, the Cour stated: "The tax
in the present case would not be affected if the nature of the property in which
the whole capital stock is invested were changed and put into real property or
bonds of New York, or of other states. From the very nature of the tax being
laid upon a franchise given by the state and revocable at its pleasure, it cannot
be affected in any way by the character of the property in which its capital
stock is invested."
Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep.
638 (1908) ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 190 (1910). While these two cases involve attempts to place a tax on a
basis of gross receipts of a corporation and a tax on the entire capital stock
where the property of the corporation for a large part was located outside the
taxing state, it seemed as if the Court had decided on a new avenue of approach
in determining the validity of all taxes in which instrumentalities of the governments, federal and state, were concerned.
7Supra Note 4. Mr. Justice Day in the prevailing opinion stated: * * * it
is therefore well settled by the decisions of this court that when the sovereign
authority has exercised the right to tax a legitimate subject of taxation as an
exercise of a franchise or privilege, it is no objection that the measure of
taxation is found in income produced in part from property which of itself
considered is non-taxable."
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case is contra to the holding in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,8 and represents the present attitude of the Court, which is that no distinction
shall be made between direct and excise taxes when levied on governmental instrumentalities.
The conclusion adopted by the Court in its decision is well stated
in the words of an extract from the opinion in Fairbank v. United
States, 9 as follows:
"* *

"1

what cannot be done directly because of constitutional

restriction cannot be accomplished indirectly by legislation
which accomplishes the same result. * * * constitutional provisions, whether operating by way of grant or limitation, are
to be enforced according to their letter and spirit, and cannot
be evaded by any legislation which, though not in terms trespassing on the letter, yet in substance destroy the grant or
limitation." 10
Encroachment on federal and state instrumentalities by the respective taxing powers has been received unfavorably by the Supreme
Court." In Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Company 12 a tax
on income derived from interest on municipal bonds was declared
unconstitutional in that it imposed a burden upon the right of the
state to borrow money. In Miller v. Milwaukee 13 an income tax on
corporate dividends paid directly from interest on United States
bonds was held invalid. It appears reasonable that any attempt to
tax income or interest received from federal or state bonds should be
frowned upon and so it is not difficult to agree with the decisions in
the Pollock and Miller cases. But the result of the Court's attitude,
to guard zealously against encroachment, has led to decisions not
easily reconcilable with the fundamental principle and concept of
"immunity." In Gillespie v. Oklahoma 14 income received from the
sale of oil and gas produced under a lease of Indian lands was held
to be immune from a state income tax. In Long v. Rockwood, 1'
the Supreme Court denied the state of Massachusetts the right to tax
income received by one of her residents as royalties for the use of
patents issued to him by the United States. Where, as in these cases,
'Ibid.
181 U. S. 283, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 648,(1901).
"Ibid. at 294, 300, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 653, 655.
" Subject, however, to instances referred to wherein the courts allowed
income from governmental instrumentalities to be employed in determining
excise, franchise and privilege taxes and other instances wherein a state tax
was in a measure levied on interstate commerce.
Stepra Note 1.
"272 U. S. 713, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280 (1927).
"257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 171 (1922).
" 277 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 463 (1928).
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the tax is not levied directly on the instrumentality and does not
affect the proper functioning of the government, it is more difficult to
fit the case to the principle. In a recent decision by the Circuit Court
of Appeals a federal tax on profits derivedfrom the resale of municipal bonds was declared unconstitutional.'" The protective cloak is
thus thrust about that which is without need of protection.
What ultimate effect the Macallen decision will have, no one can
prophesy with any degree of accuracy. This may be due in part to
the lack of judicial candor on the part of the Court on its decision
and to its departure from the course established heretofore. Certainly the decision has instilled "fear" into the17taxing bodies of states
possessing statutes similar to that in question.
A. K. B.
FEDERAL

TAx-GIFTS

INTER

VIVOS-CONSTITUTIONALITY.-

Bromley, a resident of the United -States, brought suit to recover a
tax alleged to have been illegally exacted under the Revenue Acts of
1924 and 1926, since repealed, which imposed a tax upon a transfer
of property by gift, inter vivos, not made in contemplation of death.
The plaintiff contended that the tax thus imposed was a direct unapportioned tax and therefore unconstitutional because it violated the
third clause of Section 2 and the fourth clause of Section 9 of Article
1 of the Constitution. Held, that the provisions of the Revenue Acts
of 1924 and 1926 relating to taxation by the Federal Government of
gifts inter vivos, levied an excise tax and did not impose such a
direct tax as is prohibited by the Constitution. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. -, 50 Sup. Ct. Rep.-Decided Nov. 25, 1929.
Taxes are of two kinds, direct and indirect. A direct tax is a
tax levied upon the owner of property merely because he happens to
be the owner and not because of any use or disposition he might
make of it; a tax on the property itself.' An indirect tax is one
which is assessed upon commodities before they reach the consumer
and are paid by those upon whom they ultimately fall, not as taxes,
Among indirect
but as part of the market price of the
2 commodity.
taxes fall duties, imposts and excises.
A direct unapportioned tax being forbidden by Section 2 of
Article 1 of the Constitution which requires "direct taxes to be ap" Willcuts, etc. v. Bunn, 35 F.4 (2nd) 29 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
(1929) 4 St. John's L. Rev. 138.

See

Graves, The Macallen Decision, N. Y. State Bar Assn. Bull., Dec. 1929.
v. United States, 232 U. S.261, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 421 (1913);
Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Company, 157 U. S.429, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep.
673 (1894) ; rehearing 158 U. S.601, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 912 (1895).
1Billings

Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 3rd Revision (Ed. 8) N-Z: "A tax upon certain

kinds of property having reference to their orikin and their intended use is not a
tax on the property but is an excise." Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608, 619,
22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493 (1902).

